07 September 2025

Rohingya Perspectives on Pathways to Safe, Dignified and Peaceful Future

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Overview

The resumption of conflict between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army in the Rakhine State in Myanmar has forcibly displaced over 150,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh since late 2023, who have joined over a million Rohingya refugees already living in the camps in Cox's Bazar from the previous waves of displacement mainly following the 2017 "clearance operations" by the Myanmar military.

The new refugee arrivals bring to fore the continuum of atrocities and persecution against the Rohingya minority inside Myanmar despite the international justice and accountability efforts to protect their rights, including the provisional measures ordered by the International Court of Justice.

The spillover impact of the developments in the Rakhine State, in the camps cannot be overstated – the precarious life of the Rohingya refugees already marred by insecurity due to abductions, extortion, and targeting of the community leaders by armed groups, was exacerbated by recruitment of Rohingya men and boys to fight in Myanmar. In 2024, at least 170 forced recruitment cases in the camps were reported, parallel to the Myanmar military's abduction and coercion of the Rohingya civilians in the Rakhine State to fight on its behalf, which fuelled ethnic division between the Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhist communities.

More recently, since December 2024, the Arakan Army has solidified control over 90% of the Rakhine State, and widespread abuses against Rohingya have been reported in Myanmar.

In the backdrop of such rapidly evolving security and political climate in the Rakhine and the camps, this report aims to document the grassroots Rohingya voices on the pathways to their safe, dignified and peaceful future, and present their key messages and recommendations in this regard.

The purpose of this report is to catalogue the desires of the community and untangle their interests within the wider discourse on sustainable solution to the Rohingya crisis. The report intends to inform the priorities of key member states, intergovernmental organizations, and donors, in framing the roadmap for Rohingya future at the 80th UN General Assembly High-Level Conference on situation of Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar.

More broadly, this report will build on the future-oriented focus of the report by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the 59th Human Rights Council on pathways for inclusive, democratic and peaceful future of Myanmar. The consultations will contribute toward preventing co-option of community voices by armed groups and encouraging discourse amongst the Rohingya on sustainable solutions and pathways for achieving their political aspirations. Further, it will lend nuance to the international community's over-generalized calls for Rohingya repatriation by recognizing and mainstreaming the knowledge produced within refugees' psychological and social spaces.

Key Questions

- What is the long-term vision of the Rohingya living in the camps? What pathways do they believe must be pursued to move towards this vision and address the root causes of the crisis; who should play a lead role in pursuing the pathways, and in the meantime, what are their immediate priorities?
- What is the understanding and perspectives amongst the Rohingya living in the camps of the current situation in the Rakhine State? What do they need to see to believe that Arakan Army can possibly offer a future for Rohingya in the Rakhine?
- What are the perspectives amongst Rohingya on their representation? Whom do they believe speak on their behalf, and do they believe their interests are being fairly represented?
- What do Rohingya understand as justice? What outcomes do they desire from the ongoing international justice processes?

II. Methodology

This study adopted a qualitative approach for an in-depth understanding of the subjective perspectives on the key questions across age and gender amongst the Rohingya and focusing on insights of the key informants.

The lead consultant in collaboration with a team of seven Rohingya enumerators (four male and three female) led a total of **42** consultations comprising a series of 22 focus-groups discussions (FGDs) and 20 key informant interviews (KII).

Overall, 109 individuals from 33 sub-blocks across at least 15 camps were covered across all consultations. Five of these individuals (key informants) were located outside the camps for security reasons.

Research Tool: Data was collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews based on a questionnaire (Annex A) that allowed respondents open-ended responses. At the end of the interviews, each participant was requested to respond to four questions for a qualitative analysis.[1]

Informed Consent and Confidentiality: A clear statement regarding the purpose and intended use of the research was shared at the beginning of the consent process with ample time allocated for people to ask questions and raise any concerns regarding the exercise. The data collection was carried out keeping in mind the ethical considerations in accordance with the do no harm principles and camp specific security dynamics and sensitivities. The data collected was anonymised at source to protect the identities of the participants except where participants shared a request to refer their protection concerns, such information was noted separately for referral to the relevant agency.

Selection of Participants: Male FGDs took place in randomly selected blocks and sub-blocks (using a number generator to mitigate any selection bias) within the Kutupalong Balukhali expansion. Teknaf camps and Bhashan Char were excluded due to security concerns and mobility restrictions. As consultations with Rohingya women benefit greatly from pre-established relationships where trust has been established, women's consultations occurred largely from within female enumerators' blocks, within which randomly selected sub-blocks were allocated.

KII and special populations were purposely selected in consultation with the enumerators to include diversity of opinions based on individuals' role in the camps (volunteers, *majhi*), or their work as civil society representatives, human rights defenders or documenters, social status (teacher, *imams*, former *ukattas*, *shomaz* committee), vulnerability (widows, survivors, persons with disabilities), minority status within Rohingya community (Hindu Rohingya), and year of arrival other than 2017 (registered refugees and new arrivals).

Views of humanitarian actors in the Rohingya response specifically for the selection of the community-based organizations (CBOs) based on the agencies' ongoing mapping exercises were taken. Civil Society and *Majhis* believed to have links or affiliated with the armed groups were excluded during selection for the security of the team.

Participants were selected based on their willingness and ability to participate. FGDs were organized based on age because of cultural dynamics that change what information is shared and how opinions are expressed in the presence of other generations. All interviews took place outside of humanitarian facilities, mostly in participants' shelters, or in some cases, safe space outside the camps, as necessary, to ensure participants' comfort.

[1] The four questions pertained to the topics discussed during the intervie: **(1)** What are the top 2 things that should be visible from AA to convince you that you could feel safe in Myanmar? **(2)** Who do you think represents your community with regards to the future of Rohingya? Do you feel they are representing your interests well - Yes or No? **(3)** Who (which country or which organization) should take the lead in creating the roadmap for Rohingya? **(4)** The military is planning elections in Myanmar which is being criticised. Do you think Rohingya can have a safe future under a military regime if they stay in power at centre? Yes/No?

Type of interview	Sampling	Interviews	Participants
Male FGDs, general (youth, adult, elderly)	Randomized	6	24 men
Female FGDs, general (youth, adult, elderly)	Semi-Randomized	6	24 women
Key Informants (CSOs, CBOs, HRDs, community volunteers, teachers, *majhi, im*am, female religious teacher, *shomaz* committee)	Purposive	20	14 men and 9 women
Special population FGDs (PWD, *hijra*, female headed household, new arrivals, registered refugees, Rohingya Hindu minority)	Purposive	10	19 men, 15 women, 4 hijra
	Total people consulted		109 (57m, 47f, 4 trans individuals)

Follow up Data Collection: After the initial data collection with the sample above was completed, four follow up focus group discussions with 16 individuals (eight men and eight women) were carried out for sensemaking and validation of the trends observed in the data. In total therefore, 125 participants' views formed the basis of the findings in this study.

Data transcribing and archiving: Based on consent of the participants, interviews were recorded and then translated and transcribed into English.

Data Analysis: A thematic and descriptive approach was followed to identify patterns in participants' responses and catalogue the perspectives gathered during data collection. The identification of patterns and themes was done through data coding of the interview transcripts using MAXQDA software, coupled with analysis from the follow up data collection. The analysis was also informed by the review of the key reports in the public domain by the UN, the I/NGOs, and the author's own research in the Rohingya context and consultations with multiple stakeholders to inform the data analysis and triangulation. Variations based on gender and age and as appropriate on the arrival year and vulnerability were identified through the analysis.

Limitations*:*

- The sample size and the qualitative approach adopted, while suitable for in depth understanding of subjective perspectives on a complex issue, limits statistical generalizability of the findings.
- Experiences of the refugees who have newly arrived in Bangladesh were recorded during the data collection, however these participants were not interviewed in line with the evidentiary threshold of a fact-finding exercise.
- The study reflects the views of the Rohingya living in the camps in Cox's Bazar and not in other host countries in the region or the Rohingya diaspora located in the US, Canada, Australia.

III. Key Findings

1. Pessimism amongst Rohingya about future under Arakan Army

All participants without exception across age, gender, and profiles were unanimous and emphatic in their view that it is not possible for Rohingya to lead a safe life in Arakan[2] in Myanmar under the AA.

1.1. Perceptions of the current situation in Arakan

[2] In order to best reflect the voices of the community, the findings in this report uses the historical name "Arakan" to refer to "Rakhine State", as this is the nomenclature used by Rohingya people when speaking about their homeland.

All participants shared that the situation for the Rohingya civilians in Myanmar since late 2023 has been intolerable, considering the severity of violence met out to them during the conflict between the AA and the military, and the ongoing abuses by the AA, which has made survival of Rohingya nearly impossible. Overall, participants believe that the situation has continued to decline as the AA has progressively taken control of majority of the state.[3]

The new arrivals shared that they were either ordered to vacate their villages or had to flee to save their lives during the fighting, forced to relocate to temporary camps, and evicted repeatedly from designated areas, ultimately being forced out of the country. Describing the inhumane conditions in these designated areas, participants shared that there was limited to no access to food, water and medicine.

Majority spoke about the acute humanitarian crisis in Arakan, with at least 25 participants noting the cause to be deliberate deprivation. New arrivals recounted severe food shortages, with inflated prices for basic staples and widespread hunger. which is exacerbated by the restrictions on movements and livelihood imposed by the AA. Participants explained that the AA has restricted and/or prohibited the Rohingya from fishing or farming. Many described it as part of an ongoing campaign to erase Rohingya from Arakan. Some new arrivals discussed that aid was often blocked or misappropriated, with Arakan Army staging fake aid distributions for propaganda.

Arrests and torture were reported frequently in the accounts shared by participants. Individuals were reportedly detained for activities as mundane as collecting firewood or wearing certain clothes deemed "military-like" or being accused of working with ARSA. Detainees often disappeared without trace, and even local leaders who intervened faced arrest. Forced recruitment of Rohingya youths into the military and now continuing under the AA including for forced labour under threat of punishment to families was spoken about, with those lacking eligible sons fined heavily. At least 35 participants voiced their concerns about the abduction, and sexual violence against women and girls.

At the time of flight to Bangladesh, their valuables like gold were looted, official documents confiscated, and they were made to part with the last of their money and belongings to cross the border.

Against this backdrop, people do not view AA as a revolutionary force but as "terrorists", "bandits", which feed into their pessimism and hopelessness for any prospects of safe return under the AA.

1.2 No hope for a safe and peaceful life under the Arakan Army

Each of the 109 participants expressed their pessimism towards AA. This is principally rooted in the understanding that the AA claims Arakan as the exclusive land for the Rakhine Buddhists.

***Perceived motive to erase Rohingya existence*:** The most prevailing view was that the AA does not and will never, accept the Rohingya people's ties to Arakan and allow them a place. In over 70% of the discussions (about 79 participants), participants expressed concern over AA's hatred and intolerance towards the Rohingya identity, noting that AA's motivation is to "wipe" out or "erase" the Rohingya. Another recurring view amongst participants was that should they return under the AA, the oppression will be worse than that experienced under the military, during which they could at least access food.

> *The vision of AA is to establish Arakan as a separate nation with their own government. There is no place for Rohingya in their vision.*[4]

[3] The information about the current situation shared by registered refugees and those who fled the 2017 "clearance operations" was based on the accounts they heard from the new arrivals or from their relatives in the Arakan, or in the course of their work (for key informants), and their perception of the situation was consistent with the experiences shared by the 16 new arrivals.

[4] KII.M.CSO1, Pos. 7

Now that the land is theirs, how can we go there, we have got nothing, we are just victims, even birds own their nests, but we are homeless.[5]

If AA establishes Arakan as a separate nation, they will completely erase Muslims' existence.[6]

***Perceived motive to subjugate Rohingya*:** Others, who took a more measured view of the AA's motive, equally concluded that future for Rohingya is bleak under the AA as they would at best be forced into camps, not allowed to practice their religion and may have to convert, and that the AA will take steps to achieve the same goal that Myanmar military intended, i.e., keeping Rohingya denationalized. It was pointed out that AA will "use" the Rohingya, forcing them to work for their army or do hard labour.

Once they [AA] take over entirely, they may form their government. After that, they may consider repatriating us. Though we may be repatriated, they will keep us like slaves. We can never have a peaceful future until the international community fixes it by assuring equal rights.[7]

***Unreliability*:** Those familiar with the statements by the AA and/or the United League of Arakan view AA as unreliable and untrustworthy due to lack of consistency between their statements and their actions. One key informant noted that though in some cases, Rohingya have reportedly been sent back to their villages in Maungdaw however, the houses were destroyed, and they are not allowed to use the resources to rebuild without 'payment' to the AA, effectively creating conditions for forced displacement. Another key informant spoke of the reported recruitment of the Rohingya by the AA for civil jobs such as teachers in Maungdaw, however noting that it is not possible to ascertain that these are genuine or possibly only for propaganda.

AA had asked Rohingya to work together for a revolution in Arakan, but later they changed and AA began referring to us as "Muslims" instead of "Rohingya." Tun Myint Naing tweeted that there is "no problem in calling those Bengali who were already Bengali," after gaining victories over military and becoming more powerful.[8]

1.3 Expectations from the Arakan Army

Personally, I want to hope for peaceful coexistence between Rakhine and us after AA takes over Arakan. But their actions against us do not allow me to hope for that.[9]

My expectations are absolutely nothing. They are systematically doing discrimination. They will never accept Rohingya community, never give us equal opportunity and never think positively for us. Neither AA nor the military government. They use us and when their purpose is fulfilled, they kick us out. We are like football – they are playing games with us.[10]

When asked specifically about their expectations from the AA, there were emphatic expressions of pessimism as detailed in the Finding 1.2 above.
Nevertheless, at the end of all interviews, each participant was asked to share their two expectations that they believe significant to build their confidence in AA; the results are noted in Figure 1.

[5] FGD.F.Adult2, Pos.15
[6] FGD.M.Youth1, Pos. 39
[7] KII.M.ShomazMember, Pos. 20
[8] KII.M.CSO1, Pos. 67
[9] KII.M.CSO1, Pos. 9
[10] FGD.F.Registered, Pos. 20

- 28 participants insisted that there is nothing that the AA could do to convince them that Rohingya can have a safe future in Arakan under its control. The remaining 81 participants shared a range of changes needed to build their confidence in AA.
- The majority prioritised equal treatment as the Rakhine Buddhists, and citizenship as their key expectations of the AA, mirroring the community's long-standing conditions for repatriation.
- Access to original land and allowing the Rohingya currently in the IDP camps to return to their villages was often emphasised during the consultations as a confidence-building measure.
- Assurance of safety and security of the Rohingya by the AA was an essential expectation for many participants.
- The right to movement, education, livelihood were brought up distinctly, though can be seen as part of the expectation of equal treatment; except for a few new arrivals who stated that they may feel ready to return should the restrictions on movement, work and education be lifted.
- Allowing involvement of Rohingya leaders in governance by AA was highlighted as another important confidence-building measure. AA's openness to engage in dialogue with the Rohingya or international community regarding repatriation was also suggested as another such measure. A key informant pertinently raised concern over the ambiguity regarding AA's plan for Arakan and whether it is seeking an independent nation or an autonomous region within a federal structure in Myanmar.





2. Repatriation to Myanmar is overwhelmingly desired by the community

All participants consulted believe that repatriation to Myanmar is unthinkable in the current circumstances. However, for the majority, repatriation with citizenship, recognition of Rohingya identity and restoration of all fundamental rights including access to their land, remains their enduring hope and the vision for the community.

> *We always dream of returning and living in our original land again.*[11]

> *We want to return to our country as soon as possible because we are slowly dying here.*[12]

1.1 Repatriation cannot be achieved in the current circumstances

Explaining why repatriation is not possible currently, participants noted that Arakan continues to be unsafe – on one hand due to the fighting between Myanmar military and the AA still ongoing, risks of airstrikes by the military, and the likely operations in near future to retake the townships seized by the AA, and on the other hand, conflict between ARSA/RSO and the AA, as noted by the new arrivals in particular. Participants said it was impossible to return amidst conflict till stability is restored.

> *Dr. Younus said, by next Ramadan, you will be able to celebrate Eid-ul-Fit in your homeland and visit the graves of your grandparents and pray for them, How can we believe it when Arakan is like the mouth of a tiger? Yes, it gives us hope—but hope without rights is dangerous. If repatriation takes place without any guarantee of our rights, the Arakan Army will kill us again and slaughter us like chickens.*[13]

[11] KII.M.Imam1, Pos. 20
[12] FGD.F.Elderly2, Pos. 33
[13] KII.F.ReligiousTeacher, Pos. 15

Participants equally reflected on the impossibility to return and survive in Arakan if the AA continues with its seemingly systematic policy of extorting money from the Rohingya, not allowing them to work, and committing abuses as discussed in the previous finding.

Many participants (in nearly 20% of the discussions) raised that the AA is not recognized by the international community as the formal government of Arakan to begin with, which would make repatriation impossible as they do not have the authority required to meet Rohingyas' political demand to secure citizenship of Myanmar.

> *AA is still an extremist group. So, it does not make sense that AA can repatriate us.*[14]

Key informants such as the former *ukatta*, teachers, the *imams* and the civil society also pointed out the absurdity of junta's claims on repatriation despite having lost majority control over Arakan to the AA:

> *Recently, in Thailand, Min Aung Hlaing mentioned that they have verified 2.5 lakhs of Rohingyas who will eventually be repatriated to Myanmar. He cannot repatriate us because our native [area] is not currently under his government.*[15]

Others hoped that AA might change their approach towards Rohingya to receive legitimisation by the international community. Some supported dialogue with AA as the way forward though noting that pressure from the international community will be essential, or creation of a "safe zone". (discussed under Finding 4.4 and 4.3)

> *We should keep the dialogue on with AA, but it will be difficult to move forward if the AA remains at the same position in future that they take now.*[16]

When informed about the upcoming elections announced by the junta, and asked "Do you think Rohingya can have a safe future if the military regime stays in political power? ", there was near unanimity with 95% of participants consulted stating "No".[17] It was also pointed out that the elections will not be taking place in most townships in the Arakan, so from the Rohingya standpoint, it is unclear what the elections mean for them.

Overall, there is a great deal of confusion and frustration amongst Rohingya about what the evolving dynamics in Arakan and in Myanmar mean for their repatriation. Participants were however clear that should any repatriation be forced upon them without agreement with either the AA/junta/any future government on citizenship and equal rights, it would mean life in IDP camps, oppression, and a repeated cycle of violence.

***Trauma-induced pessimism over repatriation*:** Participants in 11 consultations discussed that for them personally, repatriation is not their preference anymore though pointing out that it is their vision for their community's future.

Notably, these participants were from the FGDs held with the direct survivors, the widows, persons with disabilities - who faced severe violence in Myanmar, and continue to suffer physical and psychological impact. All of their respective reasons to not personally return to Myanmar reflected the trauma of the 2017 "clearance operations", that it would be "unbearable" and "unimaginable" to return to the scene of past horrific crimes.

[14] KII.M.Imam1, Pos. 23
[15] KII.M.Ukatta, Pos. 19
[16] KII.M.CSO2, Pos. 26
[17] The remaining 5% chose 'Maybe', reflecting that relatively speaking, their prospects of bare survival are worse under the AA.

> *Even if you kill me here, I will not return to Myanmar. My heart is not allowing me because my husband, brothers, sisters, relatives and villagers were killed by the Myanmar military. I want to be resettled because I have no husband and facing hardships to survive.*[18]

> *Look at me, what they did to my body. Only my eyes were spared, the rest was broken. They even shattered my spine. I had to take treatment for two years here. So, what will I do if I go back to Myanmar? Just go there to die? I heard they are waiting to see if anyone crosses over from here so they can chop them up.*[19]

Few were from the *hijra* community (transgender/intersex/third gender) who do not see repatriation as a possibility and that third country resettlement might be their only option to live a life free from harassment by their community and regular sexual abuse by the armed groups who often forcibly break into their shelters.

The widows talked about their hardships in the camps and the security issues confronted by their young children due to their ostracization and lack of support systems. Individuals with disabilities said that they are the "beggars" of the society.

It is clear that the vulnerabilities of marginalized sub-groups in Rohingya community have been exacerbated in displacement particularly due to activities of the criminal gangs, armed groups. From the perspective of survivors, their own society is unable to offer protection and care. Thus, the only grounds for not desiring repatriation observed during the study was trauma and social isolation.

Few from the registered refugees, mainly women noted that they have given up on the hope to return, though they wish the same for their grandchildren, as most have gone through repeated displacement and/or have spent nearly 35 years in Bangladesh during which they heard news of MoUs, high-level talks on repatriation without any result. Those born in the camps, also fear that Myanmar may never accept them even if a political solution is reached for rest of the community.

2.2 A sense of belonging to Myanmar is integrated in the Rohingya's framing of their future

The overwhelming desire and longing to return to Myanmar amongst participants cannot be overstated. Notably, the youth across general community and key informants, whilst acknowledging decades of oppression and dehumanization faced in Myanmar and the impossibility of repatriation in current circumstances, still framed their futures with a sense of belonging to Myanmar and desire to contribute.

> *Myanmar needs to accept us for the betterment of the country. Since we left Myanmar in the 2017 and 2021 military coup, Myanmar has lost a lot economically. If the nation including Rohingya in Myanmar are together without any discrimination, Myanmar will be peaceful.*[20]

> *If we are given access to education, not only will it benefit us, but it will benefit the entire country. Just as the Buddhists, Hindus, Rakhines become doctors and engineers and contribute to the nation, we Rohingya also wish to do the same. We also want to show love and loyalty we have for our country.*[21]

[18] FGD.F.Widows, Pos. 25
[19] FGD.F.Survivors, Pos. 19
[20] KII.F.HRD1, Pos. 60
[21] KII.M.CV1, Pos. 30

2.3 Conducive conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation are premised on citizenship and identity

All participants are clear that a sustainable and dignified repatriation can only take place through recognition of the Rohingya identity and grant of citizenship by Myanmar. There were no variations observed across age and gender on the question of conditions for repatriation.

Citizenship is considered as the panacea for all of their current and past hardships, for a few, almost a redeeming force for the horrific violence perpetrated against the community.[22]

> *The repatriation should be done by considering us as Rohingya.*[23]
>
> *If Myanmar accepts us by providing us the nationality cards, then we agree to be repatriated.*[24]
>
> *Resolving the identity crisis is the topmost priority, more important than punishing them.*[25]

Majority viewed citizenship as an automatic gateway for accessing the entire bundle of rights including education, movement and religious freedom in Myanmar, notwithstanding the fact that many other ethnic groups in Myanmar, such as the Shan, Kachin and also the neighbouring Chin who are official national races, have historically faced discrimination, and escalating atrocities following the 2021 illegal coup by the military.[26]

This understanding that citizenship is concomitant with rights has largely been internalized as they often trace the historic stripping of their rights to the non-recognition of their identity. In that sense, Rohingya consider their situation as distinct from other ethnicities – in that they faced a formal exclusion of their ethnic identity, and additional restrictions were placed on Rohingya. The formal recognition of their identity is viewed as the solution, and significant to lend meaning to the lives of the loved ones they lost.

In addition to education, movement, and religious freedom participants distinctly noted land as an important aspect for their repatriation. (further discussed in Box B)

Notably, few new arrivals, due to their hardships in the camps mainly the lack of shelter, shared that they may be ready to return if the constraints on survival are lifted by the AA, i.e., if they can safely live in their homes in Arakan without forced recruitment, extortion and allowed movement and work.

3. Racism, intolerance towards Rohingya identity, and a manufactured fear of Muslim majority in Arakan or Myanmar are the root causes of the crisis

It was palpably distressing for participants to reflect on the pathways that must be pursued to secure their return to Myanmar with recognition, rights, and safety as they are confronted by overlapping realities - both contemporary and historic - in the camps as well as in Arakan.

Participants shared that they feel “hopeless”, “frustrated” and “confused” discussing pathways which can possibly address both the severity of the ongoing abuses by the AA, and also navigate the root causes, which

[22] Cf. Finding 4.5 on Punishment.
[23] FGD.F.NewArrivals, Pos. 159
[24] KII.M.Imam1, Pos. 23
[25] KII.M.CSO1, Pos. 23
[26] Few participants do draw the distinction between citizenship and the other rights and understand that once citizenship is granted to the Rohingya people, access to right and equal treatment in Myanmar would still be an incremental struggle, but they too do note that the starting point must be citizenship.

have perpetuated the human rights violations and state-led violence against the Rohingya over past five decades, culminating in their current state of "helplessness" to alter their fate.

Historical perspectives on root causes: Racism on religious and ethnic grounds was most frequently discussed, in over 65% of the discussions, as the root cause of crisis.

Reflecting further on the political and socio-economic drivers of racism towards the Rohingya identity, participants (the elderly, and adults who were passed down information by their parents and grandparents in government jobs as police officers, teachers) shared anecdotes that calculative steps were taken by the local Rakhine community to spread misinformation about the Rohingya people through fabricated complaints to the Myanmar military - in order to gain higher ranked government jobs.[27] They noted that a fear of the Rohingya majority in the Arakan and risk of a populist rule was manufactured.

One of the key informants also noted lack of sufficient resistance by the Rohingya politicians[28] to the early immigration measures sanctioned by military government, such as the handover of the Rohingya people's national registration cards, which paved way for increasingly harsh restrictions, military-backed violent campaigns (particularly in 1978), followed by the adoption 1982 Citizenship Act.

Illiteracy coupled with conflict within community has perpetuated the crisis: Participants shared that denial of education to Rohingya allowed for the success of a multi-decade disenfranchisement project. Starting from discrimination in schools with teachers segregating Rohingya children and not teaching them properly, to being denied admissions for higher education - the systematic barriers to education over the years has led to loss of capacity to address the root causes through political means and formal avenues - making pursuit of future pathways difficult.

> *They denied our children's education, because they think our children could later help the community politically through education.*[29]

In more contemporary terms, there were reflections on the growing internal conflict, lack of unity as factors responsible for perpetuating the crisis. Participants noted that the Rohingya have been simply "used", served as "pawns" in the political dynamics between the Rakhine Buddhists and the junta. Few noted that some are working against the interests of their own community for economic incentives, "selling their loyalty".[30] Lack of genuine or effective leadership was also raised in this context (further discussed in Finding 6).

> *Our people were used against each other. They were used as spies who would share false information about one another, and the officials would exploit us.*[31]

Against this backdrop, two factors emerged which shape people's views on pathways for future. *One*, emphasis on the involvement of the international community in any future agreement on return due to the mistrust in the Rakhine and Burmese actors; and *two*, an emphasis on the need for unity amongst the Rohingya.

[27] The scope of the study did not include verification of these claims vis-a-vis the archival evidence.
[28] Reasons cited were misplaced trust of Rohingya leaders in the Burmese political leaders/activists at the time, and prioritisation of the fight for democracy over the issue of Rohingya nationality/autonomy.
[29] KII.M.CSO3, Pos. 69
[30] These observations were noted as part of the follow up data collection exercise done to better understand the emphasis on lack of unity within the society during data collection.
[31] FU.M.Elderly1, Pos. 90

4. Pathways towards securing the goal of repatriation with identity, rights, and safety

The pathways noted in this report were self-identified by participants and discussed amongst them during interviews. These are not mutually exclusive. Each participant often indicated multiple pathways and reflected on its positive and negative aspects.

The consultations served as an avenue for participants to discuss views on how they can achieve their civil and political aspirations. Safe civic spaces to discuss political solutions are severely lacking in the camps and such discussions risk threats from the armed groups. Therefore, in the absence of an existing public discourse, participants were not asked to choose from pre-determined options. The consultations encouraged a critical reflection on pathways, either long-term or short-term, that they may already be advocating for (in case of key informants) and those that should be undertaken (in case of general population) to support Rohingyas' safe and dignified repatriation to their homeland.

Overview of Pathways towards securing the goal of repatriation with identity, rights and safety				
Inclusive Democracy in Myanmar	**A well-trained Rohingya armed organization that is accountable to Rohingya political leadership and capable of protecting civilians**	**UN Peacekeeping Forces and Safe Zone for Rohingya in Arakan**	**Negotiating an agreement with the Arakan Army and/or the military junta**	**Acknowledgement by the wider society in Myanmar of the persecution and violence against the Rohingya**
In over 30% of the consultations, participants explicitly discussed that democracy in Myanmar would lead to a safe future for Rohingyas.	In about 25% of the consultations, participants discussed the need for the Rohingya community to have a well-trained and well-equipped armed organization for their protection comparable to armed organizations that represent the other ethnic groups in Myanmar.	In nearly 40% of the consultations, participants, mainly men, discussed the deployment of "R2P" (responsibility to protect) forces in the Arakan and creation of a "safe zone" as a pathway for safe return of the Rohingya and their peaceful future.	In over 50% of the consultations, participants discussed that a formal agreement with the AA or military junta or both, or a declaration by these parties, committing to provide to the Rohingya an official recognition of their identity, citizenship and the rights should be the way forward.	Some participants stated the need for wider engagement and dissemination of the community's historic ties and contributions to Arakan. Sincere acknowledgement of persecution and violence met out to the Rohingya, by the Rakhine people and also the wider Burmese civil society and community noted as an important aspect of memorialization and trust building initiatives in future.

4.1. Inclusive Democracy in Myanmar

In over 30% of the consultations, participants explicitly discussed democracy in Myanmar as a pathway for Rohingyas' safe future.

A new government which is legitimate and abides by the principles of fairness and equal treatment was demanded for effective repatriation. Few highlighted the need for a new constitution and laws for inclusive election to take place, i.e., allowing Rohingya to vote and to be nominated for elections. Few spoke about need for federal democracy in Myanmar to address the internal conflict between junta and ethnic armed groups. It was also suggested that the existing senior officials must be removed or demoted so that the new government is not "rotten" and past cycles of violence are not repeated.

> *The immediate priority is to first form an official government in Myanmar, as there is currently no functioning government. While forming a new government, an agreement should be made to include all ethnic communities, including the Rohingya, with equal rights and representation.*[32]

As noted in Finding 2, 95% of the participants were clear that they do not envisage repatriation for Rohingya if the military junta retains political power.

Further, in over 40% of the discussions, participants distinctly raised access to state services as a decisive factor for sustainable repatriation. It was consistently noted that Rohingya must be included in governance and in government jobs as schoolteachers, battalion leaders Arakan, for peaceful future.

Read together, this indicates that a large majority supports change in government in Myanmar in a way that allows for inclusion of Rohingya in politics and governance.

Remarkably, only a few participants (about 10) brought up the National Unity Government (NUG). Whilst acknowledging its efforts for democracy, most did not express much confidence in NUG from the perspective of Rohingya future. NUG is seen as "weak", unable to take stance on Rohingya and without any power to engage with AA. Very few noted positive sentiments such as hope for inclusive election under Aung San Suu Kyi. Overall, the sentiment was neutral to negative.

> *If the military wins the election, no one in the country will experience peace. However, if the NUG government wins, I'm not sure how effective it will be for the Rohingya but I think other ethnic groups might have a better chance.*[33]

> *The NUG called us Rohingya and others just to receive support from the international community.*[34]

***Author's Note on lack of confidence in NUG**:* The NUG's Policy Position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State in June 2021 acknowledged the rights of the Rohingya and the atrocity crimes they faced in Myanmar. NUG's Article 13 declaration the same year accepting jurisdiction of the ICC on behalf of Myanmar (though not accepted) was an important step towards accountability too. However, the consultations indicate that the NUG's post-coup pledge towards the Rohingya people has either not translated into the grass-roots discourse or viewed as genuine commitment. Notably, when the Argentinian federal criminal court issued arrest warrants against

[32] FGD.M.Elderly1, Pos. 30
[33] FGD.M.Elderly1, Pos. 96
[34] KII.M.CV2, Pos. 40

25 Myanmar officials including Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2025, the NUG did not welcome the decision - this may be considered as a lost opportunity for the NUG to have adopted a reconciliatory approach. Addressing the question of crimes against Rohingya is emblematic for the country-wide fight to address impunity.

4.2. A well-trained Rohingya armed organization that is accountable to Rohingya political leadership and capable of protecting civilians

In nearly 25% of all discussions, participants discussed the need for a well-trained, well-equipped Rohingya armed organization, comparable to other ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar.

> *Every community has its own group, so we must have ours too. Otherwise, we will not be recognized.*[35]

They expressed their frustration over the multiplicity of active Rohingya armed groups, referred to by some simply as "gangs" and their widespread criminal actions against the community - including kidnappings, extortion, sexual harassment of women and LGBTQI+ individuals, and the in-fighting to control drug business and achieve dominance.[36] Some even expressed that existing Rohingya armed groups should not exist or be disarmed due to their criminal actions and that their non-strategic skirmishes gives AA the pretext for arbitrarily abusing Rohingya, and increases the distrust between Rakhine Buddhists and the Rohingya in Arakan.[37]

It was pointed out by most participants who discussed this pathway that there must be one united armed group that reports to a political wing, and that they must be trained to protect civilians.[38]

Notably this pathway was mostly brought up following reflections on international community's inability to put necessary pressure on the Myanmar to resolve the crisis, and that therefore a Rohingya "self-defence" group must be supported.

> *There must be a written agreement guaranteeing that we will not be harmed again. We are afraid of AA because we have no guns or weapons to defend ourselves. If they give us our rights but still kill us, we will have no choice but to fight back. And if we die, there's nothing more we can do—but we will not give up our country. We cannot abandon our homeland.*[39]

In nearly 80% of the discussions on this topic, there was an acknowledgement that a united, well-trained armed organization alone cannot guarantee a peaceful environment. Participants noted the importance of having an armed defence lies to correct the unfair power dynamics in Arakan currently, and level the playing field so Rohingya leaders can have a seat at the table with AA or military with bargaining power they currently lack.

> *If we had an armed group of ours, both our group and AA could govern together. If the armed group is only from them, they will be able to persecute us again.*[40]

---

[35] FGD.M.Adult1, Pos. 119
[36] Such crimes have been attributed to the armed groups by the Rohingya humanitarian response in Cox's Bazar as noted in the protection sector reports.
[37] The Hindu Rohingya engaged during consultations were amongst those who believe that existing Rohingya armed groups should be dissolved. Further, at least two participants during the discussions raised the concern over the nexus between the military and ARSA in light of the timing of the ARSA attacks on the Myanmar police stations a day after the publication of the Rakhine Advisory Commission report, and more recently in light of ARSA's involvement in the forced recruitment for the junta in 2024 as is well documented - these very few participants raised the need to monitor use of ARSA by the junta.
[38] This view on reform of existing armed group is corroborated by Finding #6 below on Representation. In the post-interview survey, out of 91, only 5 participants noted that they positively view armed groups or leaders of armed groups as their representatives.
[39] KII.F.ReligiousTeacher, Pos. 20
[40] KII.M.ShomazMember, Pos. 29

> *A defense group alone does not guarantee a peaceful environment for us. The AA has made it clear, directly or indirectly, that they will never accept the Rohingya in Arakan. These statements suggest that Arakan will not be a peaceful, even if we are united and armed…it will only lead to more destruction. Instead, we should aim to sit at the table for dialogue and durable solutions with mediation [through] UN.*[41]

Further, nearly all participants who brought up effective armed organisation as a pathway also spoke of other pathways such as a formal agreement - indicating that for the participants, a well-disciplined armed organisation is not exclusive to other pathways nor is it a preference or priority, both morally and practically considering the military capability of the AA.

Author's Note on ongoing youth mobilisation efforts to fight AA: The mobilisation efforts by a recently emerged powerful figure in the camps, Dil Mohammad, head of an organization called Rohingya Committee for Peace and Repatriation and known widely for his role in uniting the four most prominent Rohingya armed groups, the "four-brother" alliance, were talked about by participants.

The sense gathered from the participants was that they possibly find it premature to comment directly on the reported mobilisation efforts. However, many clearly expressed not being in favour of sending youth without proper training by evoking emotions for religion or homeland. Participants noted that the 2024 forced recruitment drive in camps was widely protested. Few key informants also noted that the Rohingya groups are much weaker and the skirmishes between ARSA/RSO and the AA in Arakan have mainly been weaponized as a pretext by the AA to abuse Rohingya in Arakan - which has trapped them in a cycle of violence, thereby not leading any positive consequences for the community.

4.3. UN Peacekeeping Forces and Safe Zone for Rohingya in Arakan

In nearly 40% of the consultations, participants, mainly men, discussed the deployment of "R2P" (responsibility to protect) forces in the Arakan and creation of a "safe zone".

This request was framed as the need for a formal establishment of a peacekeeping force or monitoring system in a safe zone in the Arakan, led by the UN and backed by military protection by willing countries, and inclusive of access to humanitarian services within the zone so that the returnees can rebuild their lives. Participants who brought up R2P mostly noted that this was the only means to ensure their safety and guarantee non-repetition as they are a minority and can be attacked again, and also because the conflict between AA and the junta is likely to continue which could delay the repatriation efforts if not for a UN-supported safe zone.

"R2P" was in most instances but not all, suggested as a possible pathway for repatriation when coupled with demands as citizenship, rights and recognition of identity, not in isolation.

There was not much discussion over the positive and negative aspects of this particular pathway, except that one participant shared that this is an unrealistic expectation as it requires a UNSC resolution which is not possible due to China's and Russia's strategic and economic interests in Myanmar.

> *The world should keep us in Arkan separately by providing UN forces as security.*[42]

> *We just need the support of the international communities through R2P forces, or by creating new special forces or forces from within our community. We need a safe zone in three townships:*

[41] KII.M.CSO1, Pos. 71-72
[42] FGD.M.DirectSurvivors, Pos. 22

> *Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung. Before we are repatriated, R2P forces must be assigned for our safety and security. Then, we must be repatriated with our full citizenship rights, original homes, lands, equal rights, and most importantly, ethnic identity.*[43]

At least two key informants highlighted that the "safe zone" remains the only diplomatic path for repatriation whilst the conflict in Arakan continues and local communities remain hostile. These KIIs referred to Northern Iraq where a safe zone protected the Kurdish civilians post-Gulf war, and to East Timor where a UN-supported multinational force led by Australia created secure zones post-referendum of independence from Indonesia. The deployment of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia was raised too though noted by the participant that it was not successful in preventing the Srebrenica massacre of the Bosnian Muslims due to the lack of political will to defend the zone militarily.

4.4. Negotiating an agreement with the AA and/or the military junta

In over 50% of the consultations, participants discussed that a formal agreement with the AA or military junta or both, or a declaration by these parties, committing to official recognition of Rohingya identity, citizenship, and the rights should be the way forward.

Involvement of international community is necessary: Nearly all participants who discussed this pathway noted that an agreement must be secured with the involvement of international community. Most did not consider direct involvement of the Rohingya as a party to such agreement; thereby indicating a perceived absence of Rohingya agency in any formal political solution. Few who spoke of an active Rohingya role, also emphasised the role of international community, i.e., any negotiation or mediation or dialogue between the Rohingya and the parties (military or AA or both) must be guided by other countries as the third party.

> *There are 5 countries surrounding Myanmar and the UN – if they force Myanmar to take us on paper (citizenship) only that is the solution. We cannot get any solution through conflict.*[44]

> *The AA says we are not native to Arakan, which is why we cannot stay here. Before, the Myanmar government said the same. If we formed a group, we could not fight them because we are a minority there. It would be great if the international community could solve our issue and help us live together. There should be an agreement between the leader of AA, the Rohingya, and the Military then it will be easy for us to live in Myanmar.*[45]

Need for media and monitoring: Some participants shared conditions that they believe should be put in place for the dialogue/negotiation route to repatriation to be genuine. For instance, relevant countries and media must be put on notice to monitor the developments to ensure that the Rohingya people are not "betrayed" and forced into the displacement camps without citizenship and rights upon return.

A few others noted that any agreement once in place must be first implemented for the Rohingya currently in Myanmar before repatriation takes place.

> *There are two governments now. So, going back under that situation will not be good for us. The power must be taken by one of them. And they must give us a written agreement for whatever they promise.* [46]

Dialogue between the Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhist communities: While many people (as noted above, in over 50% of discussions) raised dialogue with the Myanmar military or any future government in the Arakan

[43] KII.M.Teacher1, Pos. 27
[44] FGD.F.Registered, Pos. 23
[45] KII.M.Majhi, Pos. 75
[46] FGD.M.Adult2, Pos. 104

as the way forward to secure their rights, only a minority, i.e., about one-third of these participants spoke of inter-community dialogue or reconciliation:

> *Rohingya people cannot live peacefully by driving the Rakhine Buddhists away, nor can the Rakhine Buddhists live peacefully by driving the Rohingya away. If any organization invites both sides, Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya, to a discussion, then the Rohingya can understand their thoughts and feelings, and they can understand ours too. In that way, we can reconcile and agree on a plan to live peacefully.*[47]

> *Rakhine and Rohingya CBOs can collaborate for inter-community dialogue as international NGOs cannot be there in Arakan.*[48]

> *We will forgive them for persecuting and displacing us. We must have good communication with them, there must be peace building, and it is important to take action against perpetrators.*[49]

Author's Note on limited inclination toward inter-ethnic dialogue for reconciliation: Sustained community-based consultations and development of a civic space are essential to fully understand whether the limited inclination towards inter-community dialogue seen in this study is inadvertent (due to lack of awareness or lack of an existing discourse on articulating this topic) or intentional (i.e., they do not find promise in grassroots level dialogue in the current circumstances)

From the limited follow up undertaken to understand the reasoning, diverging views appear. The prevailing view seems to be that the atrocities committed against Rohingya by the military, the AA are perceived as a symptom of the underlying hatred of the local community against them. In other words, it is seemingly impossible to have a dialogue with the local community which has wanted to drive Rohingya out of the land and have been the co-perpetrators or co-conspirators of the atrocities.

Teachers, educated youth and elderly male still in touch with their Rakhine neighbours or former classmates shared that their interactions are superficial; they do not see any empathy for Rohingya. Reconciliation is viewed as premature, and therefore emphasis is on formalizing an agreement, and securing assurances - this is viewed as a more realistic pathway to achieve peaceful co-existence, rather than grassroots-level trust building.

In contrast, the few who support grassroots dialogue in designing the way forward view inter-communal tensions as a result of divisive politics by the state. They believe that Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhists were, and are capable of living together peacefully, and that reform amongst Rakhine Buddhists to treat Rohingya humanely, and for Rohingya to understand concerns of Rakhine Buddhists can go a long way in preventing tensions in Arakan.

4.5. Acknowledgement by the wider society in Myanmar of Rohingya Muslims' historic ties to Arakan and their systematic persecution

Only a few participants highlighted the importance of soft justice initiatives.

At least five key informants including civil society representatives and an *imam* stated the need to promote engagement with the history of the Rohingya that can verify Rohingyas' claim to Myanmar nationality. These participants shared about the presence of the Rohingya in the country's parliament before the military government of the early 1960s. They believe that the history though publicly available must be disseminated more widely and made accessible to the Burmese people.

[47] KII.M.Imam2, Pos. 108-110
[48] KII.M.HRD1, Pos. 48
[49] FGD.F.CSO, Pos. 44

Specifically, some of these KIIs ideated that the census data available in the British archives can establish the Muslim community's presence in the modern-day Arakan area prior to colonial rule. These participants did acknowledge the reality of the cross-migration between Chittagong and Arakan over several centuries and to that extent, Rohingya people's spatial identity in the region however emphasised on the deep cultural ties of Rohingya community to the land of Arakan.

> *Since the British empire, all histories are still available. The facts can be addressed if the international community and historians from Britain hold a roundtable meeting involving AA, Rohingya and also military junta. It is compulsory to investigate and verify our claim, that we are Myanmar nationals.*[50]

> *We have to write books of our histories. We have to raise voices to let the world know all those things. We have to let the world know how systematically our identity documents were seized and how we were labelled as Bengalis.*[51]

Beyond the key informants who were able to articulate the need for initiatives to socialize the Rohingyas' historic ties to Arakan, general population also, did repeatedly bring up the pre-1960 Rohingya involvement in the government as a proof of their nationality. Therefore, it can be concluded that wider dissemination of Rohingyas' historic ties and contributions to Myanmar would be widely supported as part of future pathways. Further, sincere acknowledgement of persecution and violence by the Rakhine and the wider Burmese society was raised by a few as important for trust building.

Author's Note: While a sense of empathy by the Burmese society, messages on social media asking forgiveness from the Rohingya were seen following the 2021 military coup, however this wave of support was limited in time and space and merits further engagement within the pro-democracy movement.

Box A: Overarching preference for co-existence with Rakhine Buddhists in future

Majority of participants – ranging from those who discussed formalizing an agreement with Myanmar military and/or AA as a pathway, to those who discussed well-disciplined armed organization or change in government - brought up their overarching desire for "co-existence", to live "peacefully" with equal rights alongside Rakhine Buddhists in Arakan.

Remarkably, there were no references brought up organically to what could be considered comparable to demands for an autonomous or semi-autonomous state, during the discussions.

This is even though participants raised deep concerns over racism as one of the root causes of the crisis, viewing Rakhine Buddhists as co-perpetrators, and several did not think that in current circumstances trust building or dialogue with the Rakhine Buddhist community is possible (Finding 4.4). Irrespective, the same participants framed the future of Rohingya society in terms of co-existence, that both Rohingya and Buddhists "co-govern" or "together run" the state.

Sharing their reasons, some noted that armed confrontation for taking over a part of the state would be harmful for the Rohingya, others noted that equal treatment in Myanmar is the only path to peace. This emphasis on co-existence seems to also align with Finding 2.2 on a sense of belonging to Myanmar seen amongst participants, despite the horrific violence, and oppression, almost as a symbol of their resistance and to lend meaning to their suffering.

During the follow up data collection, to understand the reasons underlying the preference for co-existence further, participants were asked directly about their preference between an autonomous region in Northern Rakhine State and co-existence. All emphasised a preference for co-existence, noting that as a minority community, it is not realistic for them to expect an autonomous entity, or that it would be "not rightfully theirs" or that the Muslims and Buddhists had co-existed in the past. Only two individuals of the 26 people spoken with during follow up, mentioned that if co-existence is not possible in the scenario that the AA controls the full state, then they would have to ask for a separate

[50] KII.M.Ukatta, Pos. 58
[51] KII.M.Imam1, Pos. 34

BOX B: Access to land raised distinctly as important aspects of repatriation

Access to Land: Access to original land was raised distinctly and repeatedly in more than 55% of all discussions - as an essential question to be resolved in any agreement about return to Myanmar.

Participants shared that it is important that their land, i.e., their homes, farms, ponds, shops that were looted or destroyed or confiscated by either the military junta or the AA, be returned. In sharing so, there was a clear evocation of pride, a sense of deep loss. Many emphasised that it is important that the world sees Rohingya not only as victims or stateless, but landowners and even landlords, whose properties were stolen.

Many shared that they cannot agree to repatriation to be forced into IDP camps in Myanmar by AA or junta.

> *They burned our houses and bulldozed them to make it a Mogh village. We will not get the animals back alive. We do not have to take revenge for the damage. Allah will punish them for their atrocities. Right now, we want to get back our lands and live peacefully in our country. (KII.F.NewArrival, Pos. 88)*

> *The houses that were destroyed cannot be restored. If they take us back to our homeland, to our own places then we can rebuild our houses. (FGD.M.Adult1, Pos.110)*

During follow up data collection on this topic, participants shared that many in the community including some of the participants themselves still hold documentation of their land. Over the years, the nature of their documentation was changed, giving the government the power to seize, confiscate or appropriate their land. It was noted that many people lost their documents while fleeing or in the camps in the fire incidents, however their ownership can still be proven, through the government's records.

Few elderly male participants also explained that the property ownership was progressively handed to Rakhine Buddhists in Arakan. They shared that in the fear of the Rohingya majority in Maungdaw and Buthidaung, the Rakhine migrants were allowed to secure citizenship even in cases they had no proof of ancestors in Arakan. It was also noted that the Rakhine from outside Myanmar including ethnic groups like Saak, Maramm Gyi, Brua, Chakma were settled into what is referred to as "Na Ta La" villages in Arakan.

Overall, it is noteworthy that from the perspective of survivors, their land is the only asset that is capable of restitution and hence its importance in their conscience when discussing their future.

> *I don't think we will get what we have lost. I lost my husband. If I ask the world to give my husband, will they be able to give him back? No, they won't. They can give us our land and plots. Our houses were destroyed, but plots remain. [FGD.F.NewArrivals, Pos. 19]*

5. Justice means safe and rights-based return to Myanmar with restitution and compensation

All participants were briefly informed about the ongoing international justice processes at the ICC and the ICJ and then asked what they believe should be their desired outcomes.[52]

[52] Even before this question was asked, many participants had already mentioned that the "ICJ" and "ICC" are highly relevant for their safe repatriation, and amongst the key actors to ensure an agreement with the junta and/or the AA to provide Rohingya recognition, citizenship and rights.

Need for Accountability for both the military and the AA: All participants emphatically related their desire for justice (*bisar*) to the dehumanizing and undignified ouster from their lands that they held for generations, the indiscriminate killings, the beating, the rape of women, violence against infants, and mistreatment of the dead.

Several participants commonly noted that the rape survivors, mothers who lost their children and those who lost land were key demographics that must be given justice which is commensurate to their loss through compensation and that the punishment for those who committed rape must be more severe.

Justice and accountability were demanded for AA's atrocities against the Rohingya also. In at least 40% of all discussions, the need for increased monitoring of AA's actions against the Rohingya and the need for ongoing investigations to include AA's abuses was noted. This was brought up across all groups and not only the new arrivals. Several key informants, including documenters, noted that though AA claim their attacks in 2024 are retaliation to the actions of the Rohingya, the Rohingya were coerced to set fire to the Rakhine villages by the military, and were forcibly recruited by the military including from the camps, and that the AA's responses including ongoing abduction, detention and torture have been disproportionate.

Following are the key outcomes from the ongoing legal proceedings that participants shared is important for achieving justice; these were not identified as mutually exclusive nor hierarchically:

5.1. Restoring citizenship and rights

During the majority of discussions, in nearly 70%, participants shared that justice to them would mean restoration of their citizenship and equal rights as other communities in their native land, Myanmar, including access to education, work, civil services, freedom of movement and religion. Many extended the notion of justice to the restoration of rights, including citizenship which they identify as integral to regaining their dignity. Justice, restoration of rights and citizenship were often used interchangeably to the extent that the idea of justice and resolution of their statelessness is, in the minds of many, the same.

5.2. Compensation and Repossession

In 60% of the discussions, the recurring demand for restitution of land and compensation emerged.

These participants demanded the return of their seized or destroyed properties from the courts' decisions. They expressed that justice can never fully heal the trauma of losing family, but returning their land is possible and can partially address the irreversible loss. (See also, Box B above for discussion on access to land)

> *We want to see our properties legally returned to our names.*[53]
>
> *Asking to bring back the dead is impossible. But they should give us our lands, properties, rights, and citizenship. Even the law cannot deny that.*[54]
>
> *They had seized our farming lands, cultivation lands and wealth. Some of them were seized by the government and the remaining were looted by Mogh Baghi. We were forced to flee without anything, only with the clothes we were wearing. So, we want all these things back.*[55]

While few suggested that should the courts be able to facilitate the recognition of their identity, restoration of their citizenship and rights, they would not ask for their properties and compensation, a few others suggested that justice would not mean citizenship alone but also repossession of their properties.

[53] FGD.M.Elderly1, Pos. 80
[54] KII.M.CV2, Pos. 108
[55] FGD.M.Elderly2, Pos. 122

Survivors recalling beatings, imprisonment, and the murder of family members, called for compensation beyond property restoration. Compensation was understood not only as material repayment but also as symbolic recognition of their suffering and dignity.

> *Justice means that the perpetrators must also compensate for whatever they made us lose.*[56]

At the same time, there is an acknowledgment of limits. A few key informants raised that compensation was difficult even in contexts like Rwanda and Bosnia where international norms were successfully applied and people could return to their land with recognition, and support/aid.

5.3. Punishment

In 58% of all discussions, punishment for perpetrators was raised. It is seen as a requirement for deterrence and non-repetition. Participants discuss punishment through multiple lenses - emotional, legal, moral, and restorative.

> *We want legal action and punishment against specific perpetrators who committed crimes against our Rohingya brothers and sisters. The punishment should fit the level of crimes they committed. The officials who planned the system of genocide or ordered the crimes must be punished according to international law at the ICC, such as hanging or imprisonment.*[57]

A few participants linked punishment with emotional closure, dignity, and relief. They expressed that knowing international courts have taken concrete steps to punish perpetrators would ease their suffering. For them, punishment is not only about retribution but acknowledgment of their pain and validation of their suffering.

The punishments deemed appropriate by participants ranged from the death penalty and long-term imprisonment to dismissal from public offices or demotions. Survivors and those who lost many family members tended to call for the most severe punishments such as execution or death penalty. Their testimonies named Min Aung Hlaing as directly responsible, demanding the harshest accountability possible. In addition, male elderly and youth participants also lean toward severe punishment, particularly for crimes like rape and murder, reflecting their moral outrage and desire for justice for future generations.

Poignantly, the focus group discussion with women community volunteers clarified that punishment does not mean reciprocating atrocities, such as raping or burning houses in revenge. Instead, they emphasized forgiveness at the personal level while insisting that lawful punishment for perpetrators must still occur. This distinction reflects an important ethical stance, showing a rejection of vengeance. Some participants also appealed to religious and moral principle noting that both Islamic and Buddhist teachings, prohibit killing.

Other forms of reparations expected from the courts included livelihood opportunities to build resilience, meaningful support to heal from the trauma of losing families, inclusion of the history of Rohingya genocide in Burmese school curriculum and recognition of Rohingya holidays as official holidays in Myanmar.

Pessimism over delayed justice: During nearly 20% of the discussions, there was a sense of pessimism over international courts' ability to deliver timely justice and meaningful outcomes. People raised concern over the lack of enforcement power of the ICC to arrest Min Aung Hlaing even if the arrest warrants are issued against him. Some raised that the courts cannot resolve the root causes of the crisis, unless the junta or the Myanmar government agrees, and few explained that in the event of a positive ICJ ruling, it can be enforced only through the referral to the UNSC, however China and Russia support the military junta, hence that may not be possible.

[56] KII.M.ShomazMember, Pos. 68
[57] KII.M.Imam2, Pos. 95

.

6. Absence of effective political representation to lead the roadmap for future on behalf of the Rohingya

Nearly 45% of all participants expressed the view that there is currently no effective leadership representing the Rohingya community with regards to their future.

> *We have been made a leaderless community – because of the systematic lack of education.*[58]

Notably, more than 60% of the women who were consulted mainly from the general community, were not aware or were unsure about who is representing the Rohingya community with regards to future.

6.1. Majority do not view claimed community representatives as genuine leaders, or as well-intentioned yet ineffective

Participants expressed mixed views about the multiple civil society or community-based organisations and the individuals working as representatives inside the camps and within diaspora.

Negative sentiments: Many, mainly key informants including the civil society representatives themselves noted that the "self-claimed" Rohingya representatives and their respective organizations within the community do not inspire much confidence; that these individuals cannot be viewed as "true leaders" as they are not well qualified, and while their work may be well-intentioned, their advocacy and activism is not effective with regards to securing sustainable solutions or addressing the root causes of the crisis.

Several (at least 27) participants, specifically expressed negative sentiments for the diaspora leaders. Some suggested that they are only selling the Rohingya name for their own careers, some that the diaspora leaders should only serve as advisors and others noted that it is simply not possible for them to understand the crisis from a standpoint of a survivor of the 2017 attacks. Some said that social media statements, speeches at events are not sufficient and they need to see outcomes or progress to believe that diaspora leaders are working.

In addition to lack of proper qualifications, other concerns shared by the participants for their lack of confidence in the existing representatives inside or outside the camps included lack of knowledge of geopolitics, regional diplomacy, individuals' interest in seeking resettlement taking precedence over continuing the grass-roots level work dedicatedly, and also, the lack of inclusivity. Few also raised concern regarding the disconnect with the knowledge of the elderly who served in Myanmar government in the past, and at least one person raised a concern that the lines are blurred between CSO representatives and political leaders in the community.

Lack of Unity: Participants repeatedly referred to the lack of unity and the multiplicity of the claimed leaders itself as the "biggest weakness" of their community.

Further study may be needed to understand what the emphasis on unity means, and if there are any disagreements amongst the current leaders that people believe is determinantal to the progress on the sustainable solution. From the limited follow up carried out, it appears that people are concerned about the divisions and competition amongst leaders, lack of coherence in their work. They wish to see strategies being developed by qualified individuals beyond the victimization narrative, and with a sense of urgency. Some point out that armed groups and different interest groups create confusion and weaken representation.

> *If we keep relying on these leaders who are currently working, it will be like we are hoping to cross a river by holding the tail of a cow which doesn't actually have a tail.*[59]

[58] FGD.F.Registered, Pos. 55
[59] FGD.M.Registered, Pos. 75

> *[W]hen we hear our leaders, we get hopeful that we will be able to return to the country. But they are not actually doing anything. They are just good at speaking.*[60]

Positive or Neutral sentiments: On the other hand, nearly 30% participants adopted slightly positive sentiment on the representatives including the diaspora. They acknowledged the efforts by leaders like Dr Zubair, Mr. Kamal and diaspora leaders such as Nay Sin Lwin, Rezauddin, Tun Khin and organizations such as ARSPH, FDMN to the extent of bringing attention to the crisis or raising alarm about the funding crisis. Having said that, except for a few, most of these participants equally shared the concern over the perceived ineffectiveness of these efforts in relation to progressing towards solutions, sharing that the Rohingya leaders are "helpless", are "trying their best".

As noted above, the remaining 25% of the participants, mainly women, expressed neutral sentiments or shared that they are not aware of the Rohingya leadership representing their interests. Female key informants raised concern regarding the use of women as "tokenism" in important meetings and absence of women perspectives particularly on peacebuilding within the discourse on pathways for future. For instance, an initiative to share of dignity kits with the Rakhine women in Myanmar was brought up in this regard, which ultimately could not materialise.

At the end of each interview, participants were asked to share one or two individuals/organizations that they believe are the Rohingya representatives or speaking on their behalf, and to share whether they believe they are fair. The results of those most frequently mentioned are indicated in Figure 2 below.[61]



Apart from individual leaders, organizations, or generic reference to CSOs or diaspora, 12 individuals also mentioned specific armed groups or named Ataullah and the impressions were largely negative to neutral amongst these responses.[62]

6.2. Restrictions and Infantilization responsible for absence of genuine leadership

External factors responsible for lack of genuine or effective leadership were also emphasised.

[60] KII.M.Imam1, Pos. 53
[61] Note: There were nearly 20 out of the 109 individuals, mainly women, who chose to not answer the question and stuck to their view shared during the interview that they are not aware or are unsure regarding the representation with regards to future.
[62] Other individual leaders not listed above (like Now Kim, Dr. Abu Taher, Aung Kyaw Moe, Dr Show Min, Wai Wai Nu, Dr Hubaibe) were named only once and not included in the Figure.

Participants shared that the political interests of the regional powers and the support to Myanmar from China and Russia means that the voices of the Rohingya will always be overridden.

Further, participants noted that educated persons in the camps who wish to step forward to speak on behalf of the community about political matters or repatriation are helpless in the face of limited right to freedom of speech and assembly.

The youth particularly the young key informants noted that there is no physical space to hold discussions, no avenue to apply for permits to do conferences with potential allies such as the NUG to promote a political discourse and diplomacy, nor any opportunity to apply for funds to purchase for instance, data management software to do surveys, and research projects that are aimed at understanding, developing and disseminating political discourse.

> *[E]ven if our leaders try they cannot do anything. When we go to them (the CiCs) and tell them that it has been 32 years – how will we live like this – they just tell us that do not think too much. If you want to think too much, go back to Myanmar, they told me. The new leaders will be told the same.*[63]

Lack of education has stolen the chance from the youth to emerge as leaders as per some of the older participants. Pertinently, a group of registered male refugees who had the benefit of insight into the multiple waves of displacement shared that the genocide of the Rohingya people had its genesis in an apartheid system since they took away the right of the people to higher education in Myanmar. As a result, even those who are educated have only mostly studied till matriculation. Even in refuge, individuals who had completed matriculation could not become graduates in specialised fields in the last eight years. This group and several other participants talked about the need for leaders who are educated in specialised social fields such as political science, law.

Author's Note on infantilization of Rohingya response: There has been a general infantilization of the response where CSOs are not engaged with due to their lack of formal status, meaning thereby that they have not been adequately elevated, and the pathways to provide them training and support on subjects like governance, civics, peacebuilding, have not necessarily been explored within the institutional landscape of the Rohingya response. The lack of capacity of grassroots actors to advocate on repatriation is a source of frustration amongst the young participants.

6.3. Security Risks to Educated Leaders has created a chilling impact

In over 35% of the discussions, participants, both men and women echoed the concern that the educated people who hold the potential to lead with well-informed views face serious risks to their life and safety in the camps which prevents true and honest political leadership from emerging. Mohibullah's assassination was referred to by nearly all participants across age, gender and profiles, and the loss is fresh in everyone's memory. Participants also noted the targeted killings of Arifullah, Shokat Ali, Abdur Rahim, Maulana Jamal, and some head *majhis* as having created a chilling impact.

> *If a leader is raised, he gets killed by the group. They just stab the good people. So, it won't be good for those who try to rise.*[64]

> *People fear to work, because leaders are killed in the camps. Therefore, educated individuals fear to come in front of community and international communities because there is no protection for them.*[65]

[63] FGD.F.Registered, Pos. 61
[64] FGD.F.Elderly2, Pos. 70
[65] FGD.F.Widows, Pos. 42

If there is no protection, an honest person would never want to be a leader.[66]

6.4. Influential figures are not equivalent to leaders due to corruption and criminality

***Dil Mohammad*:** In more than 35% of all discussions, participants brought up Dil Mohammad. He was also amongst the most frequently mentioned individual leaders during the post-interview survey.

Participants said that they have recently heard about him due to his role in the Mission Harmony for having brought the four Rohingya armed groups together to stop their internal conflict.

Several participants noted that they could not trust someone with his profile, i.e., a spy for junta, involvement in arms and drug trafficking, and the forced recruitment activities of 2024 in the camps. Participants raised that they felt uneasy about his intentions and feared that he may be manipulating people. Others expressed that an uneducated person like him must not be the voice for the Rohingya people.

Armed Groups: Several discussed in their interviews how the armed groups tend to act as their representatives. Most expressed their frustration over this trend. Armed groups are viewed responsible for the prevailing criminality and obsessed with dominating Rohingya community. Women key informants raised that armed groups do not value women's education and therefore are not equipped to lead the community towards their political aspirations.

We can never trust or support the gangs because they have already committed killing and violence within our community. Their actions are defaming our community badly.[67]

Majhis: Further, several participants raised that the *majhis* who work as volunteers to assist the humanitarian response, are often uneducated, and involved in corruption cannot be viewed as representatives, let alone leaders for the question of future.

6.5. Quality leadership should be rooted in education, integrity and come from within the camps.

In 63% of the discussions where the qualities of ideal representation were brought up, participants stated that only an educated person could effectively represent the Rohingya cause internationally, communicate with governments, and lead with integrity. They warned that uneducated or corrupt leaders could cause harm. Participants suggested that those trained in law, politics, medicine, and religious scholarship, should work together to improve the community's situation. Some stressed that even among the educated, those with criminal records or selfish motives should be excluded.

The ability to represent at higher levels was another clear expectation. Respondents said leaders should be skilled in advocacy, fluent in relevant languages such as English and Burmese.

Many participants brought up that a leader must live in the camps. Many insisted that the leader should stay close to the community, understand its challenges, and work alongside them.

Participants stressed that leaders should be honest, transparent, loyal, and free from corruption. They should be motivated by service to the community rather than personal gain. Several voices emphasized religious devotion, such as praying regularly, and being guided by faith as markers of integrity. Some participants analogize a leader to be parents to the community, putting collective welfare above self-interest.

A recurring suggestion was the creation of a representative team rather than a single leader. This team would include men and women, young and elderly, and people from different educational and professional backgrounds. Participants argued that such a group would strengthen the community's representation, and

[66] KII.M.CV2, Pos. 92
[67] FGD.M.Rregistered, Pos. 83

reduce the risk of leaders being influenced by money or power. Some also suggested that individuals from different camps should be chosen to ensure wider participation.

> *If only 20 educated youths are selected from the camp they can form a team as representatives of the community. There should be a lawyer, a doctor, an engineer and a graduate of political science in that team. The existing leaders would use this initiative if they had any interest to work for the sake of the community, not for personal benefits.*[68]

7. Immediate Priorities

7.1. Physical safety and security risks by the armed and criminal groups

The most frequently mentioned immediate concern was the physical safety and security in the camps. Multiple accounts (raised during 56% of the discussions) described threats from armed groups such as ARSA and RSO, including kidnappings, extortion, killings, sexual assaults, and harassment—particularly targeting women, girls, human rights defenders, community leaders, and the LGBTQ/Hijra community.

21 participants emphasised the concern over kidnapping of both children and adults, discussing how ransoms ranged from 50,000 to 500,000 BDT. Participants mentioned that victims are beaten, and families are called to pay the ransom which is next to impossible when people do not have the financial means to do so.

There were repeated calls for stronger security measures, such as immediate investigations into crimes by government and security training by the UN to the youth.

> *There are many conflicts in the camp, and the block Majhi, head Majhi and police do not act rightfully. They change sides and alter matters after accepting money.*[69]

> *All corruption, rape and extortions that are happening in the camp should be investigated. Though we are staying in Bangladesh, it doesn't mean we should face human rights violations. Even a small job cannot be gained without paying an amount of bribe, 20000/30000 BDT. This is not only corruption but also human rights violations. We are already victims. If we keep facing oppressions like these, our new generations will have no space to prosper.*[70]

> *Our situation is getting worse every day. Imagine, if we do not have grocery money at home and the boy goes out to work, they catch him, beat him, tie him up, and demand 100,000 to 200,000 taka for his release. This worries me deeply. I have no husband.*[71]

7.2. Education

Education for Rohingya children and youth was repeatedly identified as a critical priority with almost 50% of the participants raising the issue. The closure of learning centres in the recent months, lack of access to higher education, poor teaching quality, and limited access to schools were seen as contributing directly to child marriage, crime, and hopelessness. Participants stressed that education is key not only to personal development but also to preventing social decline and fostering future leadership. Participants expressed distress over increase in accidents, child labour and the increased use of illicit substances among children and linked these trends to lack of education in the camps. Calls were made for reopening schools, expanding to secondary and university levels, offering vocational training, and ensuring inclusive education for marginalized groups.

[68] FGD.M.Registered, Pos. 74
[69] FGD.M.Adult1,Pos. 58
[70] KII.M.CSO1, Pos. 28
[71] FGD.F.Survivors,, Pos. 30

According to a key informant, learning centres in Rohingya camps often function like childcare facilities, offering basic activities such as rhymes and colouring rather than structured academic learning. These schools rely on underpaid Rohingya volunteers for most subjects under the Burmese curriculum, many of whom lack proper training. Rohingya teachers have remained unrecognized in the past eight years of response despite their crucial role for meaningful investment in education.

A key informant expressed hope in Rohingya-run schools which adhere to the Burmese curriculum and are now being increasingly registered under the newly established Rohingya Community Schools Board. It was suggested that instead of creating parallel systems, the response should collaborate with community-run schools, providing Rohingya teachers training and resources.

Explaining the impact of lack of opportunities for higher education, one of the key informants shared that the helplessness the youth experience is unbearable in a digital age where they can see the word moving forward without them; they earnestly wish to dedicate their mind and energy but face multiple hurdles.

> *Here in the camp, education has completely stopped… That is why our children roam around the streets with nothing to do. They are drifting away from education. If this continues for a year, no child will be in school. It feels like their lives are completely destroyed. That is why education is our first priority.*[72]

The lack of access to quality education for the Rohingya community in the camps is reminiscent of the systematic discrimination and exclusion Rohingyas faced in Myanmar.

7.3. Access to basic amenities

Addressing basic amenities emerged as another major concern. Some reported insufficient food rations, lack of meat in diet, others raised poor water access and shortages of gas cylinders and soap. Inadequate healthcare, overcrowded and deteriorating shelters, exposure to extreme weather, poor sanitation, and environmental hazards on hilly terrain were identified as compounding hardships. New arrivals highlighted the specific issues they faced with the lack of shelter assignment, rations, and health services, and were forced into costly rental arrangements; other participants also raised that supporting the new arrivals should be prioritized.

7.4. Access to income-generating opportunities

Livelihood restrictions were frequently mentioned, with refugees highlighting limited income-generating opportunities, and the need for skills training. Participants linked the absence of livelihoods to deepening poverty, dependency on aid and rations, and vulnerability to exploitation. Women, widows, and disabled individuals expressed a strong desire for vocational programs to support self-reliance.

Notably, lack of access to livelihood further exacerbates the other immediate concerns raised such as food insecurity, housing instability, or inability to afford healthcare.

7.5. Urgency of repatriation

While immediate camp conditions command much of the responses, participants consistently emphasize that these are temporary stop gaps, and the only lasting solution is a safe, dignified, and urgent return to Myanmar. Several responses make it clear that repatriation needs urgency in pursuit, not indefinite camp life. The worsening protection situation was often linked directly to calls for urgent repatriation. Violence, kidnappings, and lack of freedom were described as unsustainable.

> *If we remain here longer, internal conflicts among people will cause more violence. Our children are not receiving proper education. People are suffering from depression, dying young, fleeing to Malaysia*

[72] KII.M.CV2, Pos. 50

> *and children are getting married early. Crimes like gun violence and rape are happening, things we never saw before. If 8 more years pass, these problems will only worsen. That's why we want repatriation as soon as possible.*[73]
>
> *We do not want to stay here even for a second. How long can someone stay in other people's country? There will be respect for dogs but not for Rohingya. We must go back to our own country, and the international community must help make that happen.*[74]

Restoration of rights was also brought up in response to the question on priorities, with participants emphasizing the return of land, and ability to rebuild livelihoods in Myanmar as essential to be resolved as part of the repatriation plans. Humanitarian aid in Arakan was highlighted by a few as essential for those still inside Myanmar, who face severe shortages of food and medical care.

8. **International Community including regional and Muslim Countries/OIC should lead the roadmap for Rohingya future along with educated Rohingya leaders**

The Rohingya people expect that the "international community" will actively intervene to pressure the junta to recognize the Rohingya identity as native to Myanmar and ensure their citizenship.

To some extent, involvement of the "international community" is seen as the panacea of their grievances and the obstacles in achieving their political aspirations.

> *The world works under the UN. No one can go against the international community. If they bring the parties to meetings, then it will be solved. Otherwise, Rohingya will not be able to go back.*[75]

When asked what the international community meant to them, majority of the discussions explicitly called upon the United Nations and powerful veto-holding countries such as the United States, China, and Russia, must exert pressure on Myanmar to recognize the Rohingya as a legitimate ethnic group with full citizenship.

Neighbouring/Regional Countries: In 25% of all discussions, the role of neighbouring countries such as China, India, Nepal and Thailand was also brought up, to work with Myanmar to resolve the Rohingya issue

***Muslim countries and OIC*:** The role of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Muslim-majority countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, was raised during 20% of all discussions.

***Role of Bangladesh*:** Bangladesh was the most frequently mentioned single actor, with over 50% of the discussions referring to its role. There was a sense of gratitude for Bangladesh for shelter, aid, and advocacy. At least 23 participants urge Bangladesh to adopt a stronger role in repatriation negotiations.

International Courts: Notably, international judicial mechanisms, including the ICC and ICJ, were indicated in over 50% of discussions as essential for resolving the crisis (indicating that expectations go beyond the mandate of the judicial processes).

At the end of each interview, participants were asked to share the top one or two countries/organizations that they believe should lead the roadmap for the Rohingya future. The results of those most frequently mentioned are indicated in Figure 3 below.

[73] FGD.M.Youth2, Pos. 122
[74] FGD.M.Adult2, Pos. 84
[75] KII.M.CV2, Pos. 47



In addition to the countries and organizations noted earlier, the post-interviews also show expectation for Rohingya leadership to take the lead in resolving the crisis. Participants highlighted the role of Rohingya organizations, educated individuals, and religious leaders, though noting the absence of influential leaders to represent the Rohingya effectively, as extensively discussed in Finding 6 on 'Representation'.

Notwithstanding the majority view that the international community is responsible for resolving their crisis, there is also growing frustration and people see the failure of the international community especially as the atrocities have been allowed to happen again post-2023. Several participants highlight that despite the enormity of their suffering, the international community has failed to act decisively. This sense of being overlooked contributes to feelings of abandonment, with many describing the community as "helpless" because no global leader or body has carried forward the promises once made to them.

8.1. International support to Rohingya crisis must abandon its primary focus on aid

When asked if any important aspect about the Rohingya crisis have not been understood by key actors within the international community including donors, humanitarian actors, human rights bodies, there was a consistent concern over primary focus on aid. Participants, though grateful, believed that reliance on aid has led to diminished political and legal action for justice, repatriation and reconstruction for the community.

Specifically, 11 participants indicated that aid agencies prioritize immediate needs (food, shelter, healthcare) while neglecting the core demand for safe return with rights. They expressed that international actors appear content to maintain the Rohingya in protracted dependency on aid rather than address the structural issues.

> *The donors should understand that they should try to repatriate us. We do not need assistance; we just want to return to our homeland.*[76]

> *I thank them for sheltering and providing services to us but they aren't paying attention to our main needs at all. Our important needs are our justice and rights. We did not come here to eat WFP rations.*[77]

There is a broad consensus that resolving the crisis requires diplomatic, political and legal action. Bangladesh is repeatedly recognized both for its past support and its expected future leadership role. International courts, the UN, and States with political influence are all seen as critical to the solution.

[76] FGD.M.Elderly2, Pos. 142
[77] FGD.M.NewArrivals1, Pos. 91